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Central banking transparency is now a topic of great inter-
est, but its impact on the implementation of monetary policy
has not been studied. This paper documents that anticipated
changes in the target federal funds rate complicate open mar-
ket operations. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence
on the behavior of banks and the Open Market Trading Desk.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant shift in demand for funds ahead of
expected target rate changes and that the Desk only incom-
pletely accommodates this shift in demand. This anticipation
eﬀect, however, does not materially aﬀect other markets.
JEL Codes: E5, E52, E58.
1. Introduction
Through time, the Federal Reserve has been perceived as becoming
more open and transparent. For example, explicit announcements of
changes in the target federal funds rate began in 1994. With pre-
dictable changes in monetary policy, ﬁnancial markets move before
the Federal Reserve, not just in reaction to it. Lange, Sack, and
Whitesell (2003) ﬁnd empirical evidence of an anticipation eﬀect in
∗The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect
those of the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve System, or other members
of the staﬀ. We thank Kristin van Gaasbeck, James Hamilton, Mark Gertler,
seminar participants at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and staﬀ at the Open Market Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York for their invaluable comments. Author contact: Carpenter: Mail Stop 59,
20th and C Street NW, Washington, DC 20551; e-mail: scarpenter@frb.gov.
Demiralp: Department of Economics, Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey; e-mail:
sdemiralp@ku.edu.tr.
25
26 International Journal of Central Banking June 2006
the market for Treasury securities in the months prior to changes in
monetary policy.
In this paper, we investigate whether a similar type of anticipa-
tion eﬀect exists in the federal funds market, the overnight loans of
balances on deposit at the Federal Reserve. The supply of balances
in this market is inﬂuenced by the Open Market Trading Desk at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to push trading
in the market toward the target rate determined by the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC). On the one hand, because this
market is the most directly aﬀected by monetary policy, one might
think that an anticipation eﬀect would more likely be present in this
market. On the other hand, supply is controlled by the Desk to oﬀ-
set any rate pressures. As a result, deviations from the target could
reﬂect constraints that the Desk faces in accomplishing its goal. Pre-
dictable changes in the target rate could therefore have implications
for the conduct of open market operations. In addition, an antici-
pation eﬀect is related to, but distinct from, changes in the funds
rate that are a result of an announcement by the Federal Reserve.
Demiralp and Jorda (2002) and Hanes (2005) analyze these so-called
open-mouth operations by looking at the movement of the funds rate
after a target change announcement, not prior to it.
In this paper, we look into why an anticipation eﬀect in the
federal funds market exists and what the broader implications are.
We present evidence that the federal funds rate tends to move in the
direction of an anticipated change in policy prior to that change. We
estimate econometric models of the federal funds market at a daily
frequency in the spirit of Hamilton (1997, 1998) and Carpenter and
Demiralp (forthcoming) to ﬁlter out the systematic variation in the
funds rate and to estimate the movement that is attributable solely
to the anticipation eﬀect. Turning from the price side to the quan-
tity side, we present results on the supply of reserve balances that
suggest that the Desk increases the supply of balances in response to
the anticipation eﬀect. The fact that federal funds trade away from
the current target, however, suggests that the change in supply is not
suﬃcient to achieve the target. Indeed, in its annual report for 2004,
the Desk acknowledged that it has attempted to oﬀset only par-
tially a shift in demand, because fully oﬀsetting the demand could
lead to unwanted volatility in the federal funds market. We attempt
to assess this rationale based on our results.
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Because the anticipation eﬀect is the result of a shift in demand,
we present an optimizing, dynamic programming model of a repre-
sentative bank’s demand for daily reserve balances to explain the
shift in demand.1 The model indicates that demand is shifted by a
ﬁnite amount, suggesting that a full oﬀset to the shift in demand is
possible. First, we discuss the open market operations that would be
necessary to counteract this eﬀect. We conclude that it is possible
that fully oﬀsetting the rise in rates before fully anticipated moves
could result in a substantial decline in the funds rate relative to the
target following the FOMC meeting in question. We then document
that over the period studied, there has been no signiﬁcant increase
in volatility surrounding the meetings. Lastly, we show that there
has been little spillover from the funds market to other ﬁnancial
markets.
2. Data and Econometric Evidence
To examine the anticipation eﬀect, we turn to the market for Federal
Reserve balances. Reserve requirements, based on banks’ customers’
reservable deposits, are satisﬁed either with vault cash or with bal-
ances at the Federal Reserve. These balances are called required
reserve balances. In addition, banks may contract with the Federal
Reserve to hold more balances to facilitate the clearing of transac-
tions through their accounts. These balances are called contractual
clearing balances. Holdings of required balances—the sum of required
reserve balances and contractual clearing balances—are averaged
over a fourteen-day period called a maintenance period. Any bal-
ances held beyond the required level are called excess balances. The
market for balances is discussed in more detail in section 3.
We use business-day data from February 1994 through July 2005.
The starting date reﬂects the Federal Reserve’s adoption of a policy
of announcing changes in the target federal funds rate. We spec-
ify an equation with the deviation of the eﬀective federal funds rate
from its target as the dependent variable, and we specify an equation
with the level of daily excess reserves as the dependent variable. For
each equation, we include a lagged dependent variable to capture the
1In this paper we frequently use the generic word “bank” to represent depos-
itory and other institutions with accounts at the Federal Reserve.
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autoregressive behavior. We also include dummy variables for each
day of the maintenance period to control for systematic variation
in the variables; Carpenter and Demiralp (forthcoming) document
an intra-maintenance-period pattern to the federal funds rate. We
include the level of cumulative reserve balances to control for the
fact that demand for balances has a maintenance-period-frequency
component as well as a daily-frequency component. In an extreme
example, on the last day of a maintenance period, one would expect
demand to be lighter than usual if banks had already satisﬁed their
balance requirements for the period. We include the error for the
daily forecast of balances made by the Federal Reserve. Hamilton
(1998) and Carpenter and Demiralp (forthcoming) use this vari-
able to measure the liquidity eﬀect in the funds market. We use
it here to capture deviations in price and quantity that are due
to unintentional changes in reserve balances. As shown later, our
results for the liquidity eﬀect are broadly consistent with previous
work.
We also include separate dummy variables for “special pressure
days”—speciﬁcally, the day after a holiday; quarter end; year end;
ﬁrst of the month; ﬁfteenth of the month; month end; and settle-
ment of Treasury two-, three-, ﬁve-, and ten-year notes, including
Treasury inﬂation-protected securities.2 These are days of increased
payment ﬂows through banks’ reserve accounts and, as a result, rep-
resent days of increased uncertainty. Increased uncertainty should
be associated with a greater demand for balances to avoid an over-
draft. Finally, for the excess balances equation, we include carryover,
broken down by bank size. Everything else remaining the same, a
higher level of balances carried over from the previous maintenance
period should induce banks to hold lower balances in the current
maintenance period.
While the regressions include the control variables as well as the
variables of interest, to ease exposition, we present the coeﬃcients
on these control variables ﬁrst in table 1 before presenting the rest
of the results from the model. Looking at the dummies for the days
2We exclude Treasury bill auctions, as these are regular weekly auctions and
are thus captured by our daily dummy variables. The exceptions to this would
be the handful of occasions when bill auctions were delayed due to debt limit
constraints.
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Table 1. Control Variables
Sample Period: January 26, 1994–July 13, 2005*
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.27 0.047 0.27 0.026
DFirst Thursday −0.00082 0.015 0.65 0.28
DFirst Friday −0.058 0.016 0.056 0.26
DFirst Monday 0.0033 0.016 1.53 0.22
DFirst Tuesday −0.049 0.015 0.93 0.23
DFirst Wednesday −0.032 0.015 0.98 0.23
DSecond Thursday 0.00030 0.015 1.54 0.23
DSecond Friday −0.064 0.015 1.66 0.22
DSecond Monday 0.026 0.016 4.13 0.27
DSecond Tuesday −0.040 0.018 4.22 0.41
DSecond Wednesday 0.12 0.031 9.63 1.23
Cumulative ER× DFirst Friday −0.011 0.0030 −0.082 0.069
Cumulative ER× DFirst Monday −0.0083 0.0048 −0.089 0.069
Cumulative ER× DFirst Tuesday −0.0082 0.0028 −0.35 0.073
Cumulative ER× DFirst Wednesday −0.016 0.0041 −0.37 0.072
Cumulative ER× DSecond Thursday −0.017 0.0038 −0.70 0.074
Cumulative ER× DSecond Friday −0.013 0.0049 −1.0039 0.093
Cumulative ER× DSecond Monday −0.016 0.010 −1.79 0.24
Cumulative ER× DSecond Tuesday −0.040 0.011 −2.058 0.47
Cumulative ER× DSecond Wednesday −0.090 0.024 −4.11 1.22
(Forecast Miss)t −0.0095 0.0035 0.79 0.038
DMonth End 0.027 0.034 2.45 0.26
DMonth Start 0.012 0.021 1.60 0.22
DQuarter End 0.28 0.0764 4.27 0.41
DQuarter Start 0.17 0.081 2.54 0.42
DYear End −0.45 0.17 5.047 1.21
DYear Start 0.25 0.11 1.94 0.81
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued). Control Variables
Sample Period: January 26, 1994–July 13, 2005*
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
DMid-Month 0.09 0.012 2.31 0.20
DDay Before Holiday −0.02 0.017 0.10 0.19
DDay After Holiday −0.06 0.077 1.73 0.21
DTreasury 2 0.11 0.041 −0.85 0.36
DTreasury 3 0.065 0.032 −0.51 0.41
DTreasury 5 0.098 0.045 1.47 0.39
DTreasury 10 −0.045 0.016 −0.33 0.39
(Required Operating Balances)t 0.00070 0.00059 −0.042 0.0085
Target 0.0014 0.0012 −0.13 0.023
(Carry-in Large)t — — −0.51 0.43
(Carry-in Other)t — — 4.69 1.85
(Carry-in Large)t × Anticipated ∆ — — −5.17 12.0080
× DOne Day Before a Tightening
(Carry-in Large)t × Anticipated ∆ — — −2.931 10.021
× DOne Day Before an Easing
Note: Tables 1 and 2 report the results from the same regression but split the variables
into two groups for exposition.
*Data for 2001 exclude September 11 through September 19.
of the maintenance period, we note that both Fridays have negative
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the federal funds equation,
as shown in the second and third columns. These results suggest that
the funds rate consistently trades soft to the target on Fridays and
indicate that the Desk typically provides more reserves on Fridays
than are demanded at the target. Also of note is that the funds
rate systematically trades ﬁrm to the target on the last day of the
maintenance period. From the excess balances equation, shown in
the last two columns, we can see that excess balances tend to start
oﬀ low early in the period and gradually rise, peaking on settlement
Wednesday.
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Looking at the coeﬃcients on cumulative excess, although many
of the coeﬃcients in the federal funds equation are statistically sig-
niﬁcant, they are only economically signiﬁcant on the last two days,
where an extra $1 billion of cumulative excess is associated with 4
and 9 basis points of softness, respectively. The negative coeﬃcients
in the excess balances equation suggest that the Desk recognizes
the pressure that cumulative excess places on banks’ demand for
balances and works to oﬀset the eﬀect.
The carryover variable is negative for the large banks, indicating
that these institutions act with the motivation to maximize prof-
its and use their reserves eﬃciently. The coeﬃcient is positive for
small banks, conﬁrming our understanding that these institutions do
not closely manage their reserve positions. In order to test whether
the banks boost their balances in the maintenance period before an
anticipated rate hike in order to carry over the surplus, we inter-
act lagged carryover balances with anticipated policy changes on
the day before a target change for large banks. The coeﬃcients are
insigniﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient on the forecast miss is consistent with results in
Carpenter and Demiralp (forthcoming) for the funds rate equation.
Essentially, this coeﬃcient says that a $1 billion change in reserve
balances changes the federal funds rate about 1 basis point. For the
excess balances equation, the coeﬃcient is slightly (but statistically
signiﬁcantly) less than unity. Hamilton (1997) suggests that these
exogenous changes in reserve balances are partially oﬀset by borrow-
ing from the discount window, an interpretation consistent with a
coeﬃcient below 1. The other variables have similar, logical interpre-
tations. On balance, these control variables should allow us to focus
exclusively on the anticipation eﬀect, feeling conﬁdent that we have
accounted for other systematic variation in the dependent variables.
2.1 Measuring Anticipation
Figure 1 shows the deviation of the eﬀective federal funds rate from
the target rate on days leading up to policy changes at FOMC meet-
ings over the period 1994 to 2004. As can be seen, on days prior to
increases in the target, the funds rate was on average above the
target rate, and on days prior to decreases in the target, the funds
rate was below the target. While this evidence is suggestive, it does
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Figure 1. Federal Funds Rate Deviations from Target
Surrounding a Target Change (1994–2004)
*Data for 2001 exclude September 11 through September 19.
not control for whether or not the change in the target rate was
expected—the crux of the anticipation eﬀect.
To measure the degree of anticipation of changes in the target
rate, we use a technique that generalizes the methodology proposed
by Kuttner (2001) to measure expectations of the Federal Reserve’s
policy actions based on the price of federal funds futures contracts.3
The key idea is that the spot-month rate for federal funds futures
contracts on a particular day t reﬂects the expected average funds
rate for that month, conditional on the information prevailing up to
that date.4 Based on this fact and knowing that the eﬀective funds
3One ironic implication of the present paper is that a systematic anticipation
eﬀect should tend to get priced into futures contracts. As a result, the method for
inferring anticipated changes is likely biased. Preliminary investigation of the phe-
nomenon suggests that the bias is likely small, but future research should strive to
make the estimation precise. In any event, this bias implies that we will understate
any anticipation eﬀect we ﬁnd, so our general results should be unaﬀected.
4Naturally, this measure presumes that market participants are aware of the
target and can observe the changes. If the market participants were unaware that
the target had changed, expectations would not necessarily reﬂect the changes
in the policy instrument.
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rate as a monthly average is very close to the target rate (typically
within a few basis points), the spot-month futures rate on any day
k prior to a target change that is expected to occur on day t can be
expressed as
Spot Ratek =
[(Nb × ρt−1) + (Na ×Ek(ρt)]
N
+ µk, k < t, (1)
where ρt is the target funds rate on day t, Ek is the expectations
operator based on information as of day k, and µk is a term that may
represent the risk premium or day-of-month eﬀects in the futures
market. In an eﬃcient market with risk-neutral investors, this term
would be zero. Nb is the number of days before a target change, Na
is the number of days after a target change, and hence N = Nb+Na
is the total number of days in a given month.
Assuming that the target change occurs on day t, the spot rate
on day t is given by
Spot Ratet =
[(Nb × ρt−1) + (Na × ρt)]
N
+ µt. (2)
The diﬀerence between the spot-month rates prior to and after
the target change—i.e., equation (2) − equation (1)—gives us the
policy surprise as of day k:
Spot Ratet − Spot Ratek
= Φ [ρt − Ek(ρt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unanticipated target change as of day k
, where Φ =
(
Na
N
)
. (3)
Equation (3) is used to compute the policy surprise on any day
k prior to a target change that takes place on day t (i.e., k < t),
except for two cases:
1. Kuttner (2001) notes that the day-t targeting error and the
revisions in the expectation of future targeting errors may
be nontrivial at the end of the month. Consequently, if a
target change occurs in the last three days of the month, the
diﬀerence in one-month forward rates is used to derive the
34 International Journal of Central Banking June 2006
policy surprise, since the one-month rate reﬂects the expected
average funds rate for the next month:
(One Month Rate)t − (One Month Rate)k
= Φ [ρt − Ek(ρt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unanticipated Policy Change as of day k
,
where Φ =
(
N
N
)
= 1.
2. If the number of days in the forecast horizon is equal to (or
greater than) the day of the month in which the target is
changed, we need to use the one-month forward rate from
the previous month to assess the market’s expectations on
day k. For instance, if our goal is to derive the anticipated
policy change ﬁve days prior to a policy meeting, and if the
meeting occurs on the second day of the month, we need to
look at the one-month forward rate on day k = N − 3 of the
previous month and the spot rate on day 2 of the current
month to compute the anticipated and unanticipated policy
changes. That is,
(Spot Rate)t − (One Month Rate)Previous Monthk
= Φ [ρt − Ek(ρt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unanticipated Policy Change as of day k
, where Φ =
Na
N
.
This methodology allows us to estimate expectations of policy
changes k days prior to a target change, which extends Kuttner’s
method of computing anticipated policy actions one day before the
target change (i.e., k = 1).5 This generalization provides us with
an essential tool in testing the anticipation eﬀect, because we can
investigate how the funds rate responds to expectations as well as
how the anticipated changes evolve in the days leading to a policy
move.
5Following Kuttner (2001), we adjust for one timing mismatch on October 15,
1998, when the target change took place after the futures market had closed. In
order to deal with this occurrence, we treat the data as if the target change took
place on the next day.
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2.2 Estimating the Anticipation Eﬀect
Before we present the regression coeﬃcients associated with the
anticipation eﬀect, it is informative to take a look at how the accu-
racy of policy expectations has evolved in time. Figure 2 displays the
components of target changes that are unanticipated by the mar-
ket for policy tightenings and easings, respectively.6 Consistent with
the improvements in the transparency of monetary policy actions,
the component of target changes that surprised market participants
declined gradually over time both for policy tightenings and policy
easings.
As noted above, we interacted the expected change in the federal
funds rate with dummy variables for one through nine days before a
policy change. To avoid conditioning our estimation on whether or
not there was a policy change, a fact that is only known ex post,7 we
focus exclusively on anticipation of policy changes that took place
at FOMC meetings.8 Of course, during our sample period, there
were intermeeting policy changes, but these moves were all surprises,
and we do not believe that banks planned in advance for them. We
do, however, want to allow for an asymmetry between an expected
increase and an expected decrease. We interact the expected change
in the funds rate with a dummy variable that denotes an upcoming
FOMC meeting. To allow for the asymmetry, we create one dummy
for meetings where there was either no change or an increase in
the funds rate and another for meetings where there was either no
change or a decrease in the funds rate. We assume, therefore, that the
sign of an impending change in the target rate change is known by
banks—an assumption we view as entirely plausible. Because some
6Unanticipated change is computed as the diﬀerence between the actual size
of a target change and the anticipated change.
7We thank Jim Hamilton for pointing out our previous error in conditioning
on information only knowable ex post.
8Prior to 1998, during the period of contemporaneous reserve accounting,
reserve requirements and contractual clearing balances were calculated over a
computation period that overlapped with all but the last two days of the mainte-
nance period over which the requirements were to be satisﬁed. Since 1998, com-
putation periods have ended prior to the beginning of the maintenance period.
We interacted dummy variables for the lagged-accounting period with the antici-
pation variable to test whether or not this structural shift aﬀects our results. We
fail to reject that the coeﬃcients are jointly equal to zero.
36 International Journal of Central Banking June 2006
Figure 2. Unanticipated Target Changes on the Day
before a Policy Action
of the observations that are multiple days prior to a policy move are
in a previous maintenance period, we include in our estimation only
those anticipations that are in the same maintenance period, within
which the motivation to clear arbitrage opportunities is dominant.
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Table 2. Anticipation Eﬀect
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Anticipated ∆× DNine Days Before a Tightening 0.055 0.054 1.33 0.88
Anticipated ∆× DEight Days Before a Tightening 0.056 0.058 0.050 0.57
Anticipated ∆× DSeven Days Before a Tightening 0.014 0.044 1.23 0.58
Anticipated ∆× DSix Days Before a Tightening 0.057 0.043 0.41 0.47
Anticipated ∆× DFive Days Before a Tightening 0.028 0.044 0.31 0.34
Anticipated ∆× DFour Days Before a Tightening 0.12 0.055 0.68 0.40
Anticipated ∆× DThree Days Before a Tightening 0.29 0.060 1.26 0.34
Anticipated ∆× DTwo Days Before a Tightening 0.37 0.052 1.87 0.34
Anticipated ∆× DOne Day Before a Tightening 0.46 0.067 1.17 0.44
Anticipated ∆× DNine Days Before an Easing 0.078 0.083 1.45 1.0089
Anticipated ∆× DEight Days Before an Easing 0.11 0.13 0.38 0.53
Anticipated ∆× DSeven Days Before an Easing −0.066 0.19 −0.37 0.57
Anticipated ∆× DSix Days Before an Easing −0.11 0.11 −0.30 0.48
Anticipated ∆× DFive Days Before an Easing −0.0078 0.049 0.26 0.57
Anticipated ∆× DFour Days Before an Easing 0.078 0.058 −0.57 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DThree Days Before an Easing 0.017 0.059 −0.20 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DTwo Days Before an Easing 0.18 0.11 −0.34 0.56
Anticipated ∆× DOne Day Before an Easing 0.23 0.076 −0.055 0.74
DDay of a Tightening −0.18 0.048 0.42 0.57
DDay of an Easing 0.089 0.029 −0.38 0.36
DDay of a Tightening × Unanticipated ∆ −0.50 0.62 −5.40 7.60
DDay of an Easing × Unanticipated ∆ 0.43 0.56 5.22 2.97
Notes: Tables 1 and 2 report the results from the same regression but split the vari-
ables into two groups. For Daily ER regressions, the anticipated change variable is
replaced with a dummy variable where |Anticipated ∆| > 0.125.
The results shown are from the regression that had the control
variables reported in table 1. As shown in the second and third
columns of table 2, the results for the federal funds rate equation
indicate a statistically signiﬁcant anticipation eﬀect in the funds
market only for four days prior to a tightening and for two days prior
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to an easing.9 The coeﬃcients suggest that the funds rate moves in
the direction of the anticipated change, but not fully. Prior to antic-
ipated tightenings, the funds rate moves almost halfway—or about
121/2 basis points for an anticipated 25-basis-point policy move—to
the anticipated new target on the day before the policy change and
is elevated as many as three days prior. For anticipated easings, the
eﬀect is much more muted, although it is still statistically signif-
icant. This asymmetric eﬀect will be conﬁrmed in our theoretical
model presented below. Because requirements are satisﬁed over a
two-week period, there is an option value to waiting until the latter
part of the period to satisfy these requirements. Given this pattern,
which is reﬂected both in the data and in our model, there is less
scope for banks to react to an anticipated easing by lowering bal-
ances further to take advantage of lower expected rates later in the
period. Doing so would increase the probability of a costly overnight
overdraft, and so the anticipation eﬀect in this case is attenuated.
For anticipated policy easings, the funds rate appears to move less
than one-fourth of the way to the anticipated new target, or about 6
basis points for a 25-basis-point reduction in the target funds rate.
We do ﬁnd some evidence that the Desk accommodates the
increase in demand for reserve balances prior to an anticipated pol-
icy tightening—as indicated by the positive, statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients up to four days prior to a tightening, shown in the last
two columns. Those results imply that over the four days before a
fully anticipated increase in the target federal funds rate, the Desk
provides between $.75 and $1.75 billion more in excess reserve each
day than would be typical, holding all other things constant, for
a total of about $5 billion. Taking the results of the two equations
together, however, we can infer that the increase in supply is not suf-
ﬁcient to fully oﬀset the increased demand; the evidence is the funds
rate trading ﬁrm to the target despite an increased provision of bal-
ances. These results imply that the Desk leans against the ﬁrmness
but does not fully counteract it. Similarly, prior to anticipated policy
9For the excess balances equation, we replace the expected change with a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the expected change is greater than 121/2 basis
points; that is to say, better than even odds of at least a 25-basis-point change.
This substitution is made because banks must decide if they think a change is
coming or not, rather than acting on the size of the change, in order to shift
balances.
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easings, the Desk does not drain suﬃcient balances to oﬀset fully the
softness in the market, likely in an eﬀort to avoid leaving the System
with insuﬃcient balances.
The tightening episode that began in June 2004 has been char-
acterized as particularly well anticipated and predictable. As an
extension, we test to see if the anticipation eﬀect is diﬀerent in this
recent episode. Tables 3 and 4 present the same regressions but with
dummy variables for the 2004 tightening episode interacted with our
Table 3. Control Variables
Sample Period: January 26, 1994–July 13, 2005*
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.27 0.047 0.27 0.026
DFirst Thursday −0.0033 0.016 0.59 0.28
DFirst Friday −0.061 0.016 0.0040 0.26
DFirst Monday 0.0011 0.016 1.46 0.23
DFirst Tuesday −0.051 0.015 0.87 0.24
DFirst Wednesday −0.034 0.015 0.94 0.23
DSecond Thursday −0.0014 0.015 1.49 0.23
DSecond Friday −0.066 0.015 1.63 0.23
DSecond Monday 0.024 0.016 4.11 0.27
DSecond Tuesday −0.041 0.018 4.18 0.41
DSecond Wednesday 0.12 0.031 9.58 1.23
Cumulative ER× DFirst Friday −0.011 0.0030 −0.084 0.069
Cumulative ER× DFirst Monday −0.0087 0.0048 −0.10 0.070
Cumulative ER× DFirst Tuesday −0.0083 0.0028 −0.35 0.073
Cumulative ER× DFirst Wednesday −0.016 0.0041 −0.37 0.072
Cumulative ER× DSecond Thursday −0.018 0.0038 −0.70 0.073
Cumulative ER× DSecond Friday −0.013 0.0050 −1.0070 0.093
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued). Control Variables
Sample Period: January 26, 1994–July 13, 2005*
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Cumulative ER× DSecond Monday −0.016 0.010 −1.80 0.25
Cumulative ER× DSecond Tuesday −0.040 0.011 −2.07 0.48
Cumulative ER× DSecondWednesday −0.090 0.024 −4.10 1.22
(Forecast Miss)t −0.0094 0.0035 0.79 0.038
DMonth End 0.025 0.035 2.45 0.26
DMonth Start 0.013 0.021 1.58 0.22
DQuarter End 0.28 0.077 4.27 0.41
DQuarter Start 0.17 0.081 2.55 0.43
DYear End −0.45 0.17 5.051 1.21
DYear Start 0.25 0.11 2.017 0.76
DMid-Month 0.091 0.012 2.33 0.20
DDay Before Holiday −0.020 0.017 0.11 0.19
DDay After Holiday −0.060 0.077 1.74 0.21
DTreasury 2 0.11 0.041 −0.89 0.36
DTreasury 3 0.067 0.032 −.44 0.40
DTreasury 5 0.098 0.045 1.52 0.39
DTreasury 10 −0.044 0.016 −.34 0.39
(Required Operating Balances)t 0.00072 0.00057 −.041 0.0085
Target 0.0018 0.0013 −.13 0.024
(Carry-in Large)t — — −.54 0.43
(Carry-in Other)t — — 4.67 1.85
(Carry-in Large)t × Anticipated ∆ — — −.58 9.70
× DOne Day Before a Tightening
(Carry-in Large)t × Anticipated ∆ — — −.74 10.070
× DOne Day Before an Easing
Note: Tables 3 and 4 report results from the same regression but split the variables
into two groups.
*Data for 2001 exclude September 11 through September 19.
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Table 4. Anticipation Eﬀect
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Anticipated ∆× DNine Days Before a Tightening 0.057 0.068 0.84 0.14
Anticipated ∆× DEight Days Before a Tightening 0.013 0.045 0.18 0.55
Anticipated ∆× DSeven Days Before a Tightening 0.037 0.048 0.90 0.69
Anticipated ∆× DSix Days Before a Tightening 0.034 0.042 0.80 0.53
Anticipated ∆× DFive Days Before a Tightening −0.026 0.039 0.38 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DFour Days Before a Tightening 0.076 0.058 0.15 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DThree Days Before a Tightening 0.21 0.067 0.78 0.30
Anticipated ∆× DTwo Days Before a Tightening 0.31 0.055 1.060 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DOne Day Before a Tightening 0.42 0.086 0.38 0.44
Anticipated ∆× DNine Days Before a Tightening −0.0035 0.067 1.015 1.66
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DEight Days Before a Tightening 0.31 0.12 −0.50 1.60
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DSeven Days Before a Tightening −0.16 0.11 1.43 1.015
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DSix Days Before a Tightening 0.17 0.061 −1.54 0.61
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DFive Days Before a Tightening 0.26 0.048 −0.22 0.61
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DFour Days Before a Tightening 0.18 0.096 1.45 0.65
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DThree Days Before a Tightening 0.27 0.11 1.027 0.64
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DTwo Days Before a Tightening 0.19 0.12 1.74 0.53
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DOne Day Before a Tightening 0.11 0.11 1.87 0.76
× D2004
Anticipated ∆× DNine Days Before an Easing 0.07 0.083 1.46 1.0053
Anticipated ∆× DEight Days Before an Easing 0.11 0.13 0.39 0.53
Anticipated ∆× DSeven Days Before an Easing −0.068 0.19 −0.35 0.56
Anticipated ∆× DSix Days Before an Easing −0.11 0.11 −0.28 0.49
(continued)
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Table 4 (continued). Anticipation Eﬀect
(Deviation from
Target)t (Daily ER)t
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Anticipated ∆× DFive Days Before an Easing −0.0082 0.049 0.26 0.57
Anticipated ∆× DFour Days Before an Easing 0.078 0.058 −0.57 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DThree Days Before an Easing 0.016 0.060 −0.19 0.46
Anticipated ∆× DTwo Days Before an Easing 0.18 0.11 −0.34 0.56
Anticipated ∆× DOne Day Before an Easing 0.23 0.076 −0.060 0.74
DDay of a Tightening −0.18 0.048 0.42 0.57
DDay of an Easing 0.089 0.029 −0.38 0.36
DDay of a Tightening × Unanticipated ∆ −0.51 0.62 −5.60 7.63
DDay of an Easing × Unanticipated ∆ 0.43 0.57 5.24 2.99
Note: Tables 3 and 4 report results from the same regression but split the variables
into two groups.
In ER regressions, the anticipation variable is replaced with a dummy variable where
|Anticipated ∆| > 0.125.
anticipation-eﬀect variables. These results suggest that the anticipa-
tion eﬀect was more pronounced during this tightening cycle. The
regression that uses excess reserves as the dependent variable sug-
gests that the Desk also provided somewhat more balances in this
cycle as well. We read these results to indicate that the anticipa-
tion eﬀect is a systematic phenomenon, but the particularly clearly
signaled series of rate hikes beginning in 2004 ampliﬁed the eﬀect.
One immediate question is whether or not the Desk could fully
oﬀset the increased demand for balances in advance of an antici-
pated tightening of policy. The answer to this counterfactual ques-
tion, which we will consider in section 4, must be inferred based on
the average deviation of the funds rate from the target and estimates
of the liquidity eﬀect. The factors aﬀecting the demand for balances,
however, are complicated and reﬂect both day-speciﬁc demand and
demand for balances across the fourteen-day maintenance period.
The next section describes demand for balances, following which we
address the feasibility of completely oﬀsetting the shift in demand
and the potential ramiﬁcations.
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3. The Demand for Balances and the Anticipation
of Policy
The demand side of the federal funds market comes from banks’
desire to hold balances at the Federal Reserve. Banks exchange their
holdings of Federal Reserve balances in the federal funds market.
Total demand for balances can be broken down into three compo-
nents. First, the demand for required reserve balances—that is, funds
on deposit at the Federal Reserve to satisfy reserve requirements—is
a function of regulatory requirements imposed on banks by the Fed-
eral Reserve. The Federal Reserve requires that banks hold reserves,
either on deposit at the Federal Reserve or as vault cash, related
to the level of their customers’ transactions deposits. In addition,
banks with low levels of required reserve balances but with signiﬁ-
cant transactions hitting their Federal Reserve accounts may wish to
hold contractual clearing balances with the Federal Reserve to help
guard against overdrafts. Lastly, banks may wish to hold balances
in addition to the required or contracted level—excess balances—
because deﬁciencies on requirements and overnight overdrafts are
penalized, and so holding excess balances serves as a buﬀer.10 We
will now discuss these components in further detail, which will pro-
vide the institutional background for the demand model developed
in the appendix.
3.1 Required Reserve Balances
Required reserves are a function of the level of reservable deposits
at banks. Over a two-week computation period, the average level of
deposits and the reserve requirement are calculated. Over the asso-
ciated two-week maintenance period, which begins on a Thursday
(seventeen days after the end of the computation period) and ends
on a Wednesday, a bank must satisfy these requirements by holding
reserves on deposit at the Federal Reserve or as vault cash. Balances
held on a Friday are automatically also attributed to the following
10For a more complete discussion of the demand for reserve balances and
the federal funds market, see Carpenter and Demiralp (forthcoming) and the
references therein.
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Saturday and Sunday. The requirement must be satisﬁed on aver-
age over the maintenance period, which means that, for purposes
of reserve requirements, balances are perfectly substitutable across
days of the maintenance period.
Because of the lag between the computation period and the main-
tenance period, reserve requirements are known with certainty in
advance of the maintenance period.11 Banks are allowed to carry
over small excesses or deﬁciencies from one maintenance period to
the next. Hence, a small deﬁciency in one period can be made up in
the next period, and a small excess can be used in the subsequent
period to fulﬁll requirements. However, banks can only carry over
excesses or deﬁciencies for one maintenance period. Deﬁciencies in
required reserve balances beyond carryover provisions are penalized
at a rate of 1 percentage point (annual rate) above the primary
credit rate (that is, the discount rate) in eﬀect for borrowing from
the Federal Reserve Bank on the ﬁrst day of the calendar month in
which the deﬁciency occurs.12
3.2 Contractual Clearing Balances
Contractual clearing balances facilitate clearing of transactions
drawn on banks’ Federal Reserve accounts, and their use was
expanded with the Monetary Control Act in 1980 to help deposi-
tory institutions with low required reserve balances limit the risk
of overdrafts without having to hold large levels of excess balances.
Banks must agree in advance of a maintenance period to hold a
given level of contractual clearing balances, and—as with required
reserve balances—this level must be met on a period-average basis.
Beginning in January 2004, banks were allowed to adjust the level
of contractual clearing balances each maintenance period, but the
level may not be adjusted within a maintenance period. Contractual
clearing balances diﬀer from required reserves in an important way;
11In 1984, the Federal Reserve began “contemporaneous reserve accounting” in
which the computation and maintenance period overlapped, and banks only knew
their reserve requirement with certainty for the ﬁnal two days of the maintenance
period. In 1998, the Federal Reserve returned to “lagged reserve accounting.”
12Prior to January 2003, reserve deﬁciency charges were calculated as 2 per-
centage points above the discount rate.
Vol. 2 No. 2 Anticipation of Monetary Policy 45
banks receive implicit interest on their holdings of contractual clear-
ing balances, up to the contracted amount (plus a small allowance),
in the form of credits to defray the cost of services—such as check
clearing—provided by the Federal Reserve. Contractual clearing bal-
ances are subject to a clearing balance band of plus or minus the
greater of $25,000 or 2 percent of the contracted level, giving the
bank a bit of leeway in satisfying their requirements. Deﬁciencies
beyond the clearing band up to 20 percent of the level of contrac-
tual clearing balances are assessed a penalty of 2 percent per annum,
and deﬁciencies greater than 20 percent of contractual clearing bal-
ances are assessed a penalty of 4 percent per annum. Balances in a
bank’s account at the Federal Reserve are ﬁrst applied to required
reserve balances and subsequently used to satisfy contractual clear-
ing balances.
3.3 Excess Balances
Any balances held in excess of those required to satisfy either of the
above requirements are considered to be excess balances. Because
these balances earn no return and do not satisfy any regulatory
requirement, they have an opportunity cost of the prevailing fed-
eral funds rate. Large banks tend to manage their reserve accounts
closely and typically end each maintenance period close to zero
excess balances. Smaller banks, for which the dollar value of the
opportunity cost may be relatively small, sometimes have excess
balances, because the transactions cost of closely managing their
accounts would be too high. That said, excess balances serve as
a buﬀer against a possible costly overnight overdraft. Transactions
that are settled late in the day on a bank’s Federal Reserve account
could unexpectedly drive the balance below zero; borrowing from
the discount window is currently priced 1 percentage point over the
target rate, and overnight overdrafts are assessed a fee of 4 percent-
age points (annual rate) above the target federal funds rate—more
than a slap on the wrist. As a result, banks often demand greater
levels of excess balances when ﬂows in and out of their accounts are
in greater volumes, and thus a greater uncertainty attends their end-
of-day balance. From 1994 to 2004, total balances averaged about
$20.8 billion, of which $11.7 billion were required reserve balances,
$7.3 billion were contractual clearing balances, and $1.5 billion were
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excess balances. The lowest total balances were around $12 billion
for a couple of days in 2000.
3.4 Demand for Balances and Policy Changes
As discussed above, ﬁgure 1 displays the average deviation of the fed-
eral funds rate from the target in the four days prior to and the four
days following changes in the target federal funds rate since 1994. As
the ﬁgure indicates, there is a clear, consistent pattern of funds rates
ﬁrm relative to the target on days before increases in the target rate
and funds rates soft to the target on days before decreases in the
target rate. One of the simplest explanations for this phenomenon is
intertemporal arbitrage. If banks expect the funds rate to be higher
tomorrow, and funds are perfectly substitutable across days, there is
an incentive to bid aggressively for the funds rate today in order to
avoid borrowing funds when interest rates are expected to be high.
Although Hamilton (1997) shows that there are systematic changes
in the funds rate, and thus a strict martingale property does not
exist in the federal funds rate, we could expect arbitrage to work at
least partially in that direction.
The appendix presents in detail a dynamic-optimization model
of daily reserve demand for a representative large bank, akin to that
presented in Clouse and Dow (2002). The bank’s objective is to min-
imize the expected cost of maintaining its reserve position subject
to fees imposed for overdrafts, reserve deﬁciencies, and contractual
clearing balance deﬁciencies. The bank must choose a target level
for reserve balances each day before a random shock to its level of
balances is realized. The top panel of ﬁgure 3 plots the pattern of
daily excess for large banks averaged over maintenance periods from
1994 to present. The bottom panel plots the level of daily excess
implied by the model when the federal funds rate is set equal to
2 percent each day. The intra-maintenance-period pattern is qual-
itatively similar, lending support to the descriptive power of the
model. Of note is the fact that derived demand for excess balances
is lower on Fridays but tends to increase through the maintenance
period. The intuition is that on a Friday, the bank must pay three
days of interest in borrowing reserve balances, but an overdraft on
Friday is penalized for only one day’s overdraft. As a result, on a
relative basis, overdrafts are cheaper on Fridays than on other days,
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Figure 3. Daily Excess Balances
*Large bank excess is calculated from 1994 to present.
and banks hold less excess as insurance. For the general uptrend, the
intuition is as follows. Because holding excess funds is costly, banks
would like to balance reducing excess against the expected cost of
an overdraft and a deﬁciency. Banks want to avoid getting locked
in to too large a cumulative reserve position early in the period,
because there is limited scope to reduce balances on the last days
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of the maintenance period without incurring a high expected cost of
an overdraft. Hence, they wait until late in the maintenance period
to obtain more information about their remaining reserve need and
then hold suﬃcient balances to meet their requirements. Recall that
these day-of-the-maintenance-period shifts in demand for balances
were incorporated into our empirical models.
Next, we simulate maintenance periods in which banks correctly
anticipate that the federal funds rate will be raised from 2 percent to
21/4 percent on the ﬁrst or the second Tuesday of the maintenance
period.13 Figure 4 plots the results. Demand for balances in each
case is shifted earlier in time relative to the baseline. Banks want to
hold more of their reserve balances when funds are cheap and less
when funds are more costly. This result may seem obvious, but it is
important to note that demand is not shifted so much that there is
zero demand on days after the rate increase. In particular, the same
tension exists between holding funds early in the period and the pos-
sibility of getting locked in to an overly high level of excess balances.
We also simulate maintenance periods in which the federal funds
rate is lowered 25 basis points from 21/4 percent to 2 percent, again on
the ﬁrst or the second Tuesday of the maintenance period. Figure 5
shows the results, and the pattern is reversed qualitatively. The opti-
mal strategy is for a bank to run leaner balances early in the main-
tenance period in order to fulﬁll its requirements after the funds
rate is lower. The anticipation eﬀect is not symmetric, however, for
increases and decreases in the funds rate. Given that the optimal
strategy with no expected change in the funds rate is for banks to
carry fewer reserves early in the period, an anticipated decrease in
the funds rate reinforces the baseline case, whereas an anticipated
increase in the funds rate works against the bank’s typical strategy.
Indeed, as we have already seen earlier in the empirical results, an
anticipated decline in the funds rate creates less of a change from
the optimal program under an unchanged funds rate than does an
anticipated increase.
As was stated before, this model is only one of demand for reserve
balances, and our results in this section suggest that demand should
be shifted if the funds rate is expected to change. By combining
these results from our empirical ﬁndings on both quantity and price
13Typically, FOMC meetings and announced changes to the target fall on
Tuesdays.
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Figure 4. Daily Excess Balances
in the previous section, we can make inferences about supply and
demand together.
4. Implications of the Anticipation Eﬀect
We now explore the strategy of the Desk of only partially oﬀsetting
the anticipation eﬀect. Our theoretical model suggests an interior
solution for the portion of demand for balances that is shifted prior
50 International Journal of Central Banking June 2006
Figure 5. Daily Excess Balances
to the anticipated change; that is to say that a ﬁnite quantity of
balances should be able to satisfy this demand on the days before
the policy tightening. The intuition is fairly simple. Demand for
balances comprises day-speciﬁc demand to cover payments in and
out of a bank’s Federal Reserve account and maintenance-period
demand to cover reserve requirements and contractual clearing
balance requirements. If a large amount of balances are provided
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before the policy decision, the quantity of balances demanded follow-
ing the target change would fall, perhaps dramatically. As a result,
either the quantity supplied would outstrip the quantity demanded
and federal funds would trade far below the target rate, or banks
would have extremely lean balances and run a higher risk of over-
draft or discount window borrowing, leading to higher volatility in
the market.
Our regression results provide a means to analyze this question.
Although the results are not immune to the Lucas critique, at face
value they do provide support for the Desk’s stated intent of only
partially accommodating demand prior to changes in order to avoid
a substantial drain afterward that might lead to volatility. As ﬁrst
explored by Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp (forth-
coming), the coeﬃcient on the error of the forecast of balances used
for open market operations is an estimate of the liquidity eﬀect.
In our results, an extra $1 billion results in a 1-basis-point reduc-
tion in the federal funds rate. A 25-basis-point increase that is fully
anticipated is associated with four days of positive deviations from
the target of 3, 71/4, 91/4, and 111/2 basis points, respectively. Using
our estimate of the liquidity eﬀect, these four days would require a
total of almost $31 billion of excess reserves in addition to the $5
billion that we estimate is typically provided and in addition to any
excess that would normally be provided, like the pattern shown in
ﬁgure 3. It is the draining of these extra balances that is the dif-
ﬁculty mentioned in the Desk’s annual report. It is possible that a
large draining operation would leave balances at such a low level that
demand becomes very inelastic. As a result, a minor error in fore-
casting that causes a deviation of supply from the quantity demand
at the target could result in a large movement in the funds rate.
If the FOMC meeting takes place on the ﬁrst Tuesday of the
maintenance period, the bulk of the maintenance-period demand for
balances will have been satisﬁed with the extra provision of balances
early in the period. On days following the FOMC meeting, therefore,
the primary demand for balances is the day-speciﬁc demand. The
intertemporal substitutability of maintenance-period demand tends
to smooth the funds rate—unfulﬁlled demand on one day can be met
the next, and the funds rate need not move appreciably. Day-speciﬁc
demand, by deﬁnition, cannot be spread across days, and thus the
funds rate should be more sensitive to mismatches of supply and
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demand. Day-speciﬁc demand is driven by daily transaction needs
and is therefore much more volatile relative to requirement-related
demand—the component that can be substituted across the days of
a maintenance period. Indeed, Carpenter and Demiralp (forthcom-
ing) show that relatively small changes in the supply of balances
have little eﬀect on the funds rate precisely because of the typi-
cally intertemporal substitutability. By supplying the majority of
the maintenance-period demand for balances early in a maintenance
period, on days subsequent to an FOMC meeting, the funds rate
would be more sensitive to forecast misses on the days following the
meeting.
Moreover, it seems plausible that there may be some rough lower
bound on the absolute level of balances needed for the funds market
to function smoothly; however, estimating this bound is problem-
atic. For maintenance periods with an FOMC meeting on the ﬁrst
Tuesday, there are six remaining days over which balances could be
drained, for an average of almost $5 billion to be drained each day.
For maintenance periods with required balances of less than $18 bil-
lion, such open market operations would leave the market with a
level of total balances at the lower end of the range observed in our
sample. Of course, it is impossible to know with certainty if the Desk
could overcome the anticipation eﬀect, given the current data and
the fact that our results are implicitly conditioned on the current
operating environment. Nevertheless, plausible measures of the size
of the operations needed to oﬀset the anticipation eﬀect—and there-
fore a possible need to drain those balances later—suggest that the
argument made in the annual report has merit.
Part of that rationale is a desire to avoid undue volatility in the
funds market. Table 5 presents some of the coeﬃcients from a regres-
sion of the intraday standard deviation of the federal funds rate on
a speciﬁcation identical to that in the federal funds rate equation.14
None of the coeﬃcients is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, a fact
that suggests that the Desk’s current strategy avoids adding intra-
day volatility given the pressures of anticipation eﬀect. Indeed, the
only statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is negative in sign, suggesting
less volatility the day before an anticipated policy move.
14Intraday standard deviation is a volume-weighted measure of standard devi-
ation, based on total brokered funds rate transactions on a given day.
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Table 5. Intraday Volatility
Variable Coeﬀ. s.e.
Anticipated ∆×DNine Days Before a Tightening −0.12 0.12
Anticipated ∆×DEight Days Before a Tightening −0.059 0.039
Anticipated ∆×DSeven Days Before a Tightening −0.062 0.041
Anticipated ∆×DSix Days Before a Tightening −0.056 0.051
Anticipated ∆×DFive Days Before a Tightening −0.051 0.052
Anticipated ∆×DFour Days Before a Tightening −0.039 0.053
Anticipated ∆×DThree Days Before a Tightening −0.057 0.079
Anticipated ∆×DTwo Days Before a Tightening −0.025 0.044
Anticipated ∆×DOne Day Before a Tightening 0.049 0.086
Anticipated ∆×DNine Days Before an Easing −0.059 0.074
Anticipated ∆×DEight Days Before an Easing −0.20 0.20
Anticipated ∆×DSeven Days Before an Easing −0.39 0.31
Anticipated ∆×DSix Days Before an Easing 0.029 0.064
Anticipated ∆×DFive Days Before an Easing −0.064 0.058
Anticipated ∆×DFour Days Before an Easing −0.081 0.086
Anticipated ∆×DThree Days Before an Easing −0.097 0.056
Anticipated ∆×DTwo Days Before an Easing −0.19 0.12
Anticipated ∆×DOne Day Before an Easing −0.13 0.068
DDay of a Tightening −0.014 0.047
DDay of an Easing 0.00068 0.046
DDay of a Tightening × Unanticipated ∆ 1.10 0.79
DDay of an Easing × Unanticipated ∆ −0.93 0.32
Having established that an anticipation eﬀect exists in the fed-
eral funds market, we may ask whether or not this eﬀect spills over
to other ﬁnancial markets. Market rates can be inﬂuenced both by
current interest rates and expected future rates. Appealing to the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure, one might think of
long rates as being the average of expected future short rates plus a
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possible term premium or risk premium. If this assumption is valid,
we would expect to see the largest impact (if any) of the antic-
ipation eﬀect on other overnight rates and a diminishing impact
for longer-dated yields, because the eﬀect of the anticipation eﬀect
on short rates is conﬁned to a few days prior to each target rate
change. The rest of the expected path of short rates is unchanged.
In particular, if the market assumes a reaction function for the Fed-
eral Reserve, news about the economy could signal innovations to
expected future policy moves. In fact, Lange, Sack, and Whitesell
(2003) do present strong evidence of an improvement in the abil-
ity of ﬁnancial markets to predict future changes in policy by the
FOMC. In this section, however, we try to ﬁnd out whether the exis-
tence of an anticipation eﬀect in the funds market per se has any
impact on broader ﬁnancial markets, independent of the eﬀects of
policy anticipation on these rates. In order to capture those changes
in interest rates that are purely due to the anticipation eﬀect in the
federal funds market, we estimate an autoregressive speciﬁcation for
each interest rate, because the lagged dependent variable is expected
to capture any movements that are due to other ﬁnancial market
developments. Furthermore, we regress each rate on announcement
surprises about the producer price index, the unemployment rate,
the consumer price index, and GDP. Market expectations for each
release are estimated by the median market forecast as compiled
and published by Money Market Services the Friday before each
release. The surprise component of each data release is computed
as the actual released value less the market expectation. Lastly, we
included the ﬁtted value of the anticipation eﬀect from our previous
estimation. The general empirical speciﬁcation is of the following
form:
yt =
5∑
i=1
ξiyt−i +
5∑
i=1
γiPPI t−i +
5∑
i=1
δiUnempt−i +
5∑
i=1
αiCPI t−i
+
5∑
i=1
βiGDP t−i +
5∑
i=1
φiD
BDTightt+i Anticipated ∆
+
5∑
i=1
φiD
BDEaset+i Anticipated ∆+ εt, (4)
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where yt is the change in the interest rate measure at time t, and
PPI , Unemp, CPI, and GDP are the surprise terms associated with
these announcements.
Table 6 shows the results of several regressions in which we
attempt to quantify the impact of an anticipation eﬀect in the
funds market prior to policy tightenings on a selection of other
ﬁnancial market variables. The ﬁrst row gives the results for the
overnight Treasury repurchase agreement (RP) rate—a close substi-
tute for federal funds, because banks can meet balance requirements
also by overnight RPs. For the three days prior to an anticipated
tightening—the days when the anticipation eﬀect is the strongest—
the estimated spillover to the RP market is statistically signiﬁcant.
The point estimate suggests that almost three-quarters of the ﬁrm-
ness in the federal funds market shows up in the RP market. Fur-
ther out the yield curve, however, the eﬀect is much attenuated.
We interpret these results as suggesting that the anticipation eﬀect
in the funds market has almost no eﬀect on other ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Table 7 presents similar results for anticipated policy easings.
There appears to be a bit of evidence that yields on Treasury bills
up to three months may be aﬀected by the anticipation eﬀect in the
funds market but only for one day. Similarly, for the longer-dated
yields, there is some evidence that the anticipation eﬀect triggers a
Fisher-type response by ﬂattening out the yield curve on the day
before a policy action. In terms of eﬀecting volatility in ﬁnancial
markets, anticipated easings tend to reduce implied volatilities of
ten-year and thirty-year bonds in the two days prior to the target
cut.
5. Conclusions
The anticipation eﬀect in the federal funds market has been a topic
of growing interest over the last decade as the Federal Reserve has
become more transparent in its policy decisions. In this paper, we
document evidence of the anticipation eﬀect in the funds market
since 1994. This eﬀect became more pronounced over time and
received particular media attention prior to the policy tightenings
starting in the second half of 2004, consistent with the improvements
in the Federal Reserve’s communications policy and the public’s
expectations of policy actions.
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Table 7. Implications of Anticipation Eﬀect in Other
Financial Markets prior to Policy Easings
One Day prior Two Days prior
to an Easing to an Easing
Dependent Variable Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
RP 0.0025 0.16 −0.085 0.50
T-Bill (One-month) 0.75 0.32 0.74 0.48
T-Bill (Three-month) 0.75 0.32 0.28 0.30
T-Bill (Six-month) 0.14 0.17 0.090 0.19
T-Note (One-year) 0.098 0.18 −0.054 0.21
T-Note (Two-year) 0.12 0.18 −0.24 0.26
T-Note (Five-year) 0.14 0.18 −0.40 0.33
T-Note (Ten-year) 0.16 0.18 −0.42 0.35
T-Bond (Thirty-year) 0.18 0.17 −0.39 0.28
Implied Volatility −0.011 3.55 2.97 4.33
(Eurodollar)
Implied Volatility −0.0094 0.49 −2.52 0.88
(10-yr T-Note)
Implied Volatility −1.35 0.61 −2.27 0.98
(30-yr T-Bond)
The theoretical model developed in this paper conﬁrms the intu-
ition that banks have an incentive to shift their holdings of reserve
balances to the days when funding is expected to be cheaper. The
results from the econometric equations suggest that demand does
indeed shift as predicted in theory, but supply does not shift to the
same extent. As a result, the funds rate moves in the direction of the
anticipated change. Furthermore, this anticipation eﬀect is signiﬁ-
cantly larger in the post-2004 period, which gave rise to the media
attention mentioned above.
A natural question would be whether or not this eﬀect can be
eﬀectively counteracted by the Open Market Trading Desk. Because
a change in the target for the federal funds rate requires a deci-
sion by the Federal Open Market Committee, a plausible goal for
the Desk would be to maintain the old target until the new one is
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announced. A deﬁnitive answer is impossible, given the fact that
our results are estimated over a period that is characterized by
only partial accommodation of the increased demand. Neverthe-
less, we ﬁnd that oﬀsetting the anticipation eﬀect is likely possible
but would require extremely large open market operations, poten-
tially leaving the market with a level of balances at which demand
is quite inelastic. Indeed, even if the Desk were able to force trad-
ing to the target, the rationale stated by the Open Market Trading
Desk—only partially accommodating the increased demand to avoid
volatility later—remains a plausible characterization of the market.
If the supply of balances were increased in advance of an antici-
pated tightening, it is likely that the only demand for balances in
the days following the tightening would be the day-speciﬁc demand
to clear payments. This demand is much less elastic with respect to
price than period-average demand, because it cannot be substituted
across days. As a result, the funds rate could become quite sensitive
to small errors in supply provision, and the market could become
volatile. Our results suggest no such increased volatility, which we
interpret as support for the Desk’s current strategy.
The existence of an anticipation eﬀect in the funds market also
has implications for the traditional view of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. The conventional view relies on the liquidity eﬀect
to explain how open market operations aﬀect the overnight rate;
increased supply lowers the funds rate, and decreased supply raises
the funds rate. The phenomenon referred to as “open-mouth opera-
tions” following Guthrie and Wright (2000) suggests that the Federal
Reserve can aﬀect the funds rate merely through statements. Prior to
announcing changes in the target rate (i.e., prior to February 1994),
changes in the target rate were sometimes signaled to the market by
the use of certain types of open market operations. The empirical
evidence shown in this paper suggests that the Desk does not need
to implement open market operations to signal target changes, and
indeed the funds rate moves toward the new target even before the
announcement of the policy move and prior to the implementation of
open market operations associated with the new target in the post-
1994 era. Nevertheless, both the anticipation eﬀect studied here and
open-mouth operations rely on the credibility of the Desk to main-
tain the funds rate. That is to say, market participants must believe
that supply and demand will subsequently be aligned at the target
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rate. Hence, while the existence of an anticipation eﬀect implies
funds rate movements independent of changes in the balances prior
to a policy move, it necessitates a strong liquidity eﬀect on other
days, as documented in Carpenter and Demiralp (forthcoming).
The anticipation eﬀect is clearly important in the federal funds
market. The evidence presented above, however, suggests that the
marginal impact of the anticipation eﬀect in the funds market on
broader markets is minimal. To be sure, with increased transparency
of monetary policy, markets have begun to price in changes that are
well anticipated. We test to see whether, over and above this eﬀect,
the anticipation of policy changes in the funds market spills over
to other markets. We conclude that, in line with the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure, the eﬀect is minimal outside of
overnight markets.
Appendix. Theoretical Model of the Demand for Balances
Speciﬁcally, consider the following objective function at the business-
day frequency:15
min
x∗t
E
{(
10∑
t=1
(odt + xtﬀt
)
+ rd + ccbd − cbe
}
, (5)
where E is the expectations operator. The bank is attempting to
minimize the expected cost of its reserve account, which comprises
overdraft fees, od t; the cost of borrowing funds in the market,16
xtﬀt (where xt is the bank’s closing balances and ﬀt is the pre-
vailing federal funds rate); deﬁciency fees for required reserves, rd ;
and deﬁciency fees for contractual clearing balances, ccbd ; but is
reduced by earnings on contractual clearing balances, cbe. The bank
is assumed to choose a target closing balance x∗t that is subject to
a stochastic shock, so that
xt = x∗t + εt
εt :N(0, σ2ε).
15As noted in Stigum (1990), the bulk of the transactions in the federal funds
market are overnight.
16Without loss of generality, the cost of funds could also be considered the
opportunity cost of not lending out funds the bank has into the market.
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The cost of overdrafts is deﬁned as
od t = min[xt, 0] *φod , (6)
where φod is the overdraft fee. The cost of reserve requirement
deﬁciencies is computed on a period-average basis as a function of
required reserve balances (RR), so we write
rd = max
[
RR −
10∑
1
x∗tω, 0
]
*φrd (7)
ω =
{
3 if t = 2, 7
1 otherwise
,
which says that Fridays count three times and φrd is the reserve deﬁ-
ciency fee. The cost of deﬁciencies for contractual clearing balances
can be written as
ccbd =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0
if CCB −
(∑10
1 x
∗
tω − RR
)
≤ 0
CCB −
(
RR −∑101 x∗tω) *φ1cbd
if 0 < CCB −
(∑10
1 x
∗
tω − RR
)
≤ .2CCB
CCB −
(
RR −∑101 x∗tω) *φ2cbd
if −.2 ∗ CCB < CCB −
(∑10
1 x
∗
tω − RR
)
(8)
where φ1cbd and φ
2
cbd are contractual clearing balance deﬁciency fees.
The above expression combines the maintenance-period-average
nature of contractual clearing balances with the nonlinear fee struc-
ture attached to deﬁciencies. Finally, earnings credits reduce the cost
of the reserve position by
cbe =
(
RR −
10∑
t=1
xt
)
* ecr , (9)
where ecr is the earnings credit rate.
Taken together, these equations deﬁne a stochastic, nonlinear,
ﬁnite dynamic programming problem with ten periods where the
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choice variable is the target closing balance on each of the ten
business days of the maintenance period. The model abstracts from
uncertainty about the federal funds rate, carryover provisions, and
the clearing balance allowance. Funds rate determination is over-
looked for now, as this is only a model of demand; supply of bal-
ances will be discussed below. Although the carryover provisions can
be important (see Clouse and Dow 2002), the fundamental story
is unchanged, and including carryover would introduce a signiﬁ-
cant increase in computational complexity.17 The clearing balance
allowance is a minor omission that is of little relevance.
Solving the model allows us to examine the implied demand for
excess balances on a daily basis throughout the maintenance period.
Although excess balances are strictly deﬁned only for a maintenance
period as a whole, the concept of daily excess is useful. Daily excess
can be deﬁned as the level of balances on a day less one-fourteenth
the level of required balances—that is, what excess would be if
requirements were deﬁned daily instead of biweekly. We simulate
our model using 2 percent as the target (and therefore expected)
federal funds rate. Based on the actual rules for Federal Reserve
balances, overdraft fees are 4 percent; reserve deﬁciencies are penal-
ized at 1 percentage point over the primary credit rate, which is 1
percentage point over the target rate, for a deﬁciency fee of 4 per-
cent. Contractual clearing balance deﬁciencies up to 20 percent of
the clearing balance are penalized at 2 percent, and deﬁciencies over
20 percent of the clearing balances are penalized at 4 percent. We
chose reserve requirements to be $10 billion and contractual clearing
balances to be $10 billion to roughly replicate the aggregate funds
market. We chose the variance of the stochastic shock so that the
level of excess balances for a two-week reserve maintenance period
was $1.5 billion, essentially calibrating the model to the actual data.
The model is solved as follows. The state variable is deﬁned as the
cumulative position to date; that is, the sum of end-of-day balances.
This variable is used in the ﬁnal period to calculate whether or not
period-average balance requirements are fulﬁlled. Accordingly, a grid
for the state variable is constructed. The model is solved recursively,
17Our results in the empirical section suggest that the abstraction from carry-
over does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the implications derived from the
model.
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beginning with the last day of the maintenance period. For each
value of the state variable—here equal to the position-to-date at the
end of the ninth day—an optimal choice for the tenth day’s target
closing balance is chosen. This value is selected by evaluating a grid
for the choice variable at each possible value. The stochastic shock
to end-of-day balances is simulated by a ten-point discrete approx-
imation to a normal distribution. The maintenance-period cost of
each value of the choice variable can thus be computed in expected
value for each value of the state variable. Thus, we ﬁnd a mapping
between the state variable coming into the last day and the optimal
choice conditional on the state variable.
We can assign an expected cost to each value of the state variable
at the end of day 9. Assuming that an optimal choice will be made,
we can step back to the optimal choice for day 9. For each grid value
of the state variable at the end of day 8, we can search to ﬁnd the
optimal choice for day 9. Each possible value of the choice variable
will imply, in expected value, a particular value of the state variable
at the end of day 9 and, thus, from our previous computation, an
expected cost for the maintenance period as a whole. That is to say,
the optimal choice on day 9 is conditional on both the value of the
state variable at the end of day 8 and the expected cost associated
with the expected value of the state variable at the end of day 9
that is determined by the choice on day 9. This logic is recursed
back to the ﬁrst day. For each day, then, we have an optimal choice
of a target end-of-day balance that is assigned to each grid value
of the state variable. To simulate a maintenance period, we begin
on day 1, assume the state variable is equal to 0, take the optimal
choice of target end-of-day balance for a state variable of 0, and add
a draw from a random normal variable. We then compute the end-
of-day position for day 1 (that is, the realized balance) and proceed
to day 2, taking this end-of-day balance as our new value for the
state variable. We select the optimal target balance in day 2 and
proceed forward to the end of the maintenance period.
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